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Summar y :  Beauty, a property of existence in the Neo-Th omistic view, allows one to perceive 
it as a property of reality and of human artefacts, including art. It can be found in human be-
haviour and in the tradition of culture in the form of harmony, perfection and brilliance. An 
examination of beauty should be subject to the principal rules of study in metaphysics. Beauty 
is an important factor in the development of personality: it raises and ennobles. Th e love of 
beauty incorporates rest and respite, which are necessary for human development. Not being 
subject to the virtue of prudence, art itself does not seek to make man better, because it is all 
about creating a work of art. Neo-Th omists see a confl ict between morality and art in this fact; 
the risk does not occur when the artist takes ethics “as his or her own”. In this case, he or she 
unknowingly creates ethical works or art. Art is undoubtedly of great social importance and 
it should fulfi l an important social mission through aesthetic education by making available 
to the widest possible group of people truth, beauty and goodness.
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Introduction
Neo-Th omism is a new reading of Th omas Aquinas’ philosophy and its broad and 
creative continuation. One of its main versions was the Leuven Neo-Th omism 
School3 started by Désiré J. Mercier4. Th e incentive for the development of Neo-
Th omism was provided by the Aeterni Patris Encyclical of Pope Leo XIII (1879)5. 
Th e Neo-Th omistic programme emphasised the need to develop not only meta-
physics but also theories of cognition, logic, psychology, sociology and natural 
science6. Neo-Th omism was not a simple return to the 13th-century Th omism and 
it gained the status of a philosophy that was open to the contemporary achieve-
ments of natural sciences in the opinion of its many inspirers and creators. Th e 
medievalist studies outside of Leuven (e.g. conducted by Franz Ehrle, Étienne 
Gilson, Clemens Baeumker, Pierre Mandonnet) showed that the opinions dis-
seminated by the proponents of diff erent philosophical orientations about the fall 
of the medieval philosophy have no objective grounds in the original works. Such 
hypotheses are supported by prominent authorities, such as D.J. Mercier, É. Gil-
son and Jacques Maritain7. 
Th e Neo-Th omists’ contribution is not limited to the interpretation of new 
problems or the correction of old comments in the original works of the medieval 
philosophers. Th eir scope is wide8. However, it is possible to briefl y summarise 
it in the following way: J. Maritain popularised the Th omist thought; É. Gilson 
discovered its depth and relevance; Mieczysław A. Krąpiec and his colleagues Ste-
fan Swieżawski, Marian Kurdziałka, Karol Wojtyła, Andrzej Maryniarczyk, Zofi a 
J. Zdybicka gave it an adequate rank by formulating the contemporary version 
3  For other versions of Neo-Th omism, see e.g. Mieczysław Gogacz, „Tomizm egzystencjalny na 
tle odmian tomizmu”, in: W kierunku Boga (Warsaw: Wyd. ATK 1982), 59–82; Mieczysław A. Krą-
piec, „Tomizm transcendentalizujący”, in: Powszechna encyklopedia fi lozofi i, vol. 9 [Lublin: Polskie 
Towarzystwo Tomasza z Akwinu (hereinaft er PTTA) 2008], 512–514.
4 Th e primacy granted to Désiré J. Mercier is sometimes questioned as this development oc-
curred in similar directions also in other locations – including in Poland in Lviv – independently of 
him and without any connection to Louvain (C. Głombik, „Galicyjskie początki neoscholastycznej 
odnowy polskiego katolicyzmu”, in: Galicja i jej dziedzictwo, ed. Andrzej Meissner, Jerzy Wyrozum-
ski, vol. 3 (Rzeszów: Edit. WSP 1995), 119–120.
5  Barbara Żulińska informs that the revival of Th omism is the achievement of the Polish 
resurrectionists, who sent a Memorial to Leo XIII requesting the recognition of Th omism as the 
leading philosophy of Catholicism (see: eadem, Ku zmartwychwstaniu. Zagadnienia pedagogiczne 
(Trenton: Wyd. Sióstr Zmartwychwstanek 1955).
6  Zdzisław Pawlak, „Tomizm lowański”, in: Powszechna encyklopedia fi lozofi i, vol. 9 (Lublin: 
PTTA 2008), 508.
7  Ibidem, 509.
8  Th e refl ection of these changes in pedagogy is more broadly discussed by e.g.: Janina Kost-
kiewicz, Kierunki i koncepcje pedagogiki katolickiej w Polsce 1918–1939 (Kraków: Ofi cyna Wydaw-
nicza „Impuls” 2013), 87–190; Tadeusz Kaszuba, „Piotr Semenenko a odnowa fi lozofi i scholastycz-
nej”, Studia Philosophiae Christianae 2(1968): 219–223.
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of realistic philosophy in the process of its development and developing its basic 
fi elds related to the understanding of the world, man and culture9. Neo-Th omists 
were known to depart from the mainstream of Th omism and direct their think-
ing towards deformations, which consisted in the Th omist realism sometimes 
losing “what was its essence, namely its autonomy in relation to other sciences 
and philosophies and the neutrality at the point of departure”10. Th e contempo-
rary circles of philosophers in the area of the Christian culture consider realistic 
philosophy in the version of existential (Neo)Th omism to be one of the most ad-
equate methods of both qualitative and humanistic understanding of the world, 
man and his actions11.
During the 20th-century interwar period (1918–1939) in Poland, a circle of 
philosophers of education and educationalists who took Neo-Th omism as the 
basis of their thinking created a scientifi cally meaningful environment. In this 
short period, they produced a huge scientifi c output which strongly supported 
the development of pedagogy in an extremely valuable – because highly human-
istic – direction. In their pedagogical concept, none of the groups working on 
the development in Catholic pedagogy in the interwar period in Poland departed 
from their Neo-Th omistic foundations. Th e philosophical realism that is charac-
teristic of the foundations of this pedagogy is present not only in (Neo)Th omism 
(Jacek Woroniecki, Wincenty Granat, Kazimierz Kowalski, Jan Salamucha) but 
also in the Catholic pedagogy of culture (Jan Ciemniewski, Zygmunt Bielawski, 
Barbara Żulińska) and the personalistic pedagogy oriented at social (Stanisław 
Podoleński, Aleksander Wóycicki, Karol Górski) and existential (Józef Roskwital-
ski, Ludwika Jeleńska) issues12. Nowadays, neotomism is the basis for philosophi-
cal and pedagogical refl ection (eg. in the works of Marek Rembierz13 or Maria 
M. Boużyk14); it is also a keenly developed current of contemporary pedagogy (eg 
in the works of Mieczysław Gogacz15 and his followers or Jarosław Horowski16).
9  Tomasz Mioduszewski, Spór o realizm w lubelskiej szkole fi lozofi cznej (Ząbki: „Apostoli-
cum” 2013).
10  Andrzej Maryniarczyk, „Tomizm”, in: Powszechna encyklopedia fi lozofi i, vol. 9 (Lublin: 
PTTA 2008), 507.
11  Ibidem.
12  Th e extensive bibliography of the works of the above-mentioned authors is contained in: 
Kostkiewicz, Kierunki i koncepcje, 649–697. 
13  Marek Rembierz, „Realizm metafi zyczny jako inspiracja myśli pedagogicznej. O refl eksji 
antropologiczno-pedagogicznej Stefana Swieżawskiego i jej znaczeniu dla teorii wychowania oraz 
analiz metapedagogicznych”. Polska Myśl Pedagogiczna 2 (2016): 135–174.
14  Maria M. Boużyk, „Myśl pedagogiczna Adama (Jacka) Woronieckiego w wybranych publi-
kacjach z okresu 1903–1918”. Polska Myśl Pedagogiczna 1 (2015): 221–240. 
15  Mieczysław Gogacz, Podstawy wychowania (Niepokalanów: Wydawnictwo Ojców Fran-
ciszkanów 1993).
16  Jarosław Horowski, „Pedagogika neotomistyczna w Polsce w XX wieku. Od koncepcji wy-
chowania do teorii wychowania”. Polska Myśl Pedagogiczna 3 (2017): 45–61.
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In the interwar period in Poland, the problem of beauty and aesthetic educa-
tion was above all engaged by Kazimierz Kowalski. However, these issues were 
raised by Karol Górski and Barbara Żulińska, Stefan Szuman17, as well. Th eir 
works will become the basis for the Neo-Th omistic defi nitions of beauty, art, and 
aesthetic education used in here.
Beauty from the Neo-Thomistic perspective
Th e views of Neo-Th omists on beauty are the consequence of their views on 
“ fi nite” being and are consistent therewith. It is assumed here that the view on 
the knowledge of the material world or the world connected to the matter exerts 
a signifi cant infl uence on human activities and life. In this regard, Th omism has 
a theory of form and matter which explains “both the permanence and chang-
es of the material world according to certain results of experience and the great 
principles of metaphysics of being”18. In relation to the supernatural world, ex-
planatory methods are provided by the Th omist theology, which – together with 
the Th omist philosophy – has knowledge of the causes and eff ective remedy of 
spiritual crises. Th e Th omistic views on these issues aff ect the way and contents of 
resolutions in social, moral and civic education, which is emphasised by the Neo-
Th omists themselves and which K. Kowalski expresses through his references 
to the role of authority (also the authority of God) in building social and educa-
tional relations and in the preparation of man for establishing good relationships 
through education19.
Both Th omism and Neo-Th omism have their own theories and concepts of 
beauty, which were complemented gradually as they developed. Th eir dominant 
point of departure is the recognition of beauty as a property of being. But before 
we touch its depths, one can generally say that beauty (kalós in Greek, pulchritu-
do, pulchrum in Latin) is a property of “the reality, human artefacts, including art, 
and human behaviour expressed in the Western tradition in the form of harmony, 
perfection or brilliance, which – being viewed or viewable – arouse pleasure”20. 
It is worth mentioning that this defi nition – although given by a contemporary 
17  Particularly remarkable are the forgotten but still prevailing works of Stefan Szuman, such 
as: idem, „Cele wychowania estetycznego”, Przyjaciel Szkoły 14 (1925): 401–404; idem, Sztuka dziec-
ka (Warszawa: Książnica – Atlas 1927).
18  Kazimierz Kowalski, Św. Tomasz z Akwinu a czasy obecne (Poznań: Księgarnia Św. Wojcie-
cha 1935), 45.
19  Kazimierz Kowalski, „O społeczeństwie, władzy i autorytecie”, Ruch Katolicki 2(1932): 
102–111.
20  Piotr Jaroszyński, „Piękno”, in: Powszechna encyklopedia fi lozofi i, vol. 8 (Lublin: PTTA 
2007), 199.
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philosopher of art – both conforms with the understanding of beauty by the Neo-
Th omists and is rooted in it too.
Th e Th omistic views on beauty – as already mentioned – are part of its views 
on the fi nite being. Th is fact is important in relation to beauty for two reasons. 
Firstly, beauty in the order of a “detached essence” is formally independent and 
therefore can be the subject of an independent branch of philosophy – thus 
there is place for aesthetics in Neo-Th omism and it forms a developed branch of 
knowledge. Th is is worth emphasising as aesthetics and the place for beauty de-
rive from the structures of Th omism as a philosophy and are not a consent to the 
“developmental need” of the culture or humanity. Secondly, concrete beauty and 
real artistic creativity are part of the moral order – this fact has multiple eff ects 
and contexts apart from the fact that beauty cannot be the exclusive and ultimate 
goal of human interests.
In addition to beauty being an object of aesthetics, it also includes the activi-
ties that produce beautiful items (so there is place for e.g. the principles of beauty 
and art there). Its scope includes – probably most tangibly and practically – the 
products of the activity mentioned above, i.e. the works of art and the knowledge 
of beauty itself (aesthetic cognition)21. On the other hand, aesthetics was defi ned 
by Neo-Th omists as “the rational science or philosophy of beauty in general”22.
As an object of aesthetics, beauty can be studied. Since beauty is a property 
of being, it should be subject to the principal rules of metaphysical studies. In 
its classical version, being is examined as both being and the properties of being 
called transcendentals (apart from being, these include thing, one, something, 
good and the truth). Th e status of beauty with regard to transcendentals is debat-
able, which, in my view, is less important from the perspective of specifi c sciences 
than from the perspective of metaphysics itself.
Being part of the moral order, beauty raises the problem of relationships in all 
matters related to it – mainly between art and morality. In the Th omistic theory 
of beauty, we can fi nd a harmonious and balanced synthesis of both objectively 
transcendental and humanly psychological factors23. Th ey all fall into the catego-
ry of beauty. Currently, this position is maintained by Piotr Jaroszyński24.
Some authors believe that beauty may not be included in transcendentals be-
cause it does not refer to every being since some things are ugly (P.M. de Munny-
nck), not all are harmonious (M. de Wulf), beauty does not refer to every element 
of being but only to the form (M.-D. Philippe); some claim that beauty is only 
a genus of good (J. Kleutgen) while others say that it is a synthesis of recognised 
transcendentals – especially of the truth and good (A.B. Stępień). Th is group of 
21  Kazimierz Kowalski, Zagadnienie piękna, seria: Studia Gnesnensia (Lwów: Drukarnia Domi-
nikańska 1932), 48.
22  Ibidem.
23  Kowalski, Św. Tomasz, 50.
24  Jaroszyński, „Piękno”, 201.
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philosophers, however, is a minority and most Neo-Th omists claim that beauty is 
a separate transcendental property of being, even though it is a synthesis of the 
truth and good (e.g. E. Gilson, M.A. Krąpiec) or the truth, good and being (e.g. 
E. Chapmann) or even all transcendentals (J. Maritain). 
At present – as theoreticians claim – beauty is most frequently indicated in 
relation to art, sense perception and feelings25. Th is was not always the case. In 
their refl ections, ancient Greeks associated beauty fi rst with reality (cosmos) and 
morality. Noteworthy are the traditions of the relationships between beauty and 
morality: fi rstly, they are older than Christianity; secondly, they do not bring the 
art (work) to the fi rst plan.
Within the area of the Neo-Th omistic tradition lies also the problem of aes-
thetic impression. Th e Neo-Th omists of the interwar period generally acknowl-
edged the existence of two extreme directions for interpretation of aesthetic im-
pression which exert infl uence on a false interpretation of beauty:
– the fi rst is aesthetic sentimentalism, which values the signifi cance of 
the impression of beauty too low by exposing sense perception equal 
to sentimental realisation of the order and proportion (e.g. G.W. Leibniz, 
A.G. Baumgartner);
– the other is aesthetic rationalism, which maintains that aesthetic cognition 
has no connection or has little connection to the senses. According to the 
creators of this direction (G.W.F. Hegel, Neo-Kantists), it is the soul that 
produces forms of beauty (aesthetic objects). Reaching these forms (attain-
ing them) results in aesthetic experiences (impressions). From aesthetic 
rationalism emerged aestheticism, which wanted to include all the specu-
lative and moral life exclusively within beauty26;
– Neo-Th omists are equally critical of the studies in aesthetics and the ten-
dencies in culture that wanted to establish the artist or viewer as the ul-
timate criterion of beauty and art (subjectivism and aesthetic individual-
ism); this also applies to the directions which saw this criterion in society 
(aesthetic sociology).
Th e rejection of these extreme theories is the basis for indicating and recog-
nising the universality of the Neo-Th omistic theories.
1. Knowledge of beauty in the aspect of its educational role
Both Th omism and Neo-Th omism assume that aesthetic cognition is included 
in the entirety of human cognitive activity and is one of its kinds. It is an inward, 
sensory and mental activity. It is worth emphasising the universality of the roads 
leading to the knowledge of beauty stressed in Neo-Th omism. It is claimed here 
25  Ibidem, 199–201.
26  Kowalski, Zagadnienie piękna, 47.
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that aesthetics tries to explain all issues “with the deepest natural causes and rea-
sons, both psychological and metaphysical”.27
As all things are fi rst perceived by the senses and then “investigated by the 
mental cognitive power, the objects of cognition (in the earthly dimension) are 
the material forms realised in a material way, “i.e. the being of objects that are ma-
terial or connected to the matter. Hence, it is impossible to make aesthetic cogni-
tion without a sensory perception (which I will return to – JK). So, the beauty 
that is available for direct human cognition”28 can only be the beauty of beings, 
or perceivable objects. Logically related with that is the claim that in fi eld of “the 
artistic cognition, the artist’s and viewer’s personalities and the objective values 
of the work of art play an important role in creating the aesthetic impression”29. 
And although it is assumed here that man experiences beauty through his senses, 
imagination and mind, one sees the necessity saying that “every philosophy of 
beauty should ultimately fi nish its theses through metaphysical examination of 
the question of beauty in general”30. Th e knowledge of beauty is obtained in the 
context of and on the background of metaphysics but also with the exposure of 
views on man (anthropology) and all assumptions of epistemology – and then 
there is some room for the specifi city of its cognition.
Among the views on man – in the context of the ability to know beauty – the 
importance of individual issues is as follows:
– Th e fi rst is the attitude of Th omism to reason, which “emphasises – on the 
one hand – the absolute value, objectivity and true value of the natural hu-
man cognition, and on the other hand it upholds the thesis of the analogy 
of minds, the superiority of the angelic mind, and especially of God’s, over 
human’s”31.
– Th e second power of man is the will which, by virtue of his nature, strives 
for good (although Neo-Th omists give education some tasks in this re-
gard – e.g. M. Gogacz). Th e will is the cause and basis of the dynamism of 
human activities (hence stagnation, ossifi cation or stability are not among 
the characteristics of the Catholic culture). Th e study of human will is bal-
anced, does not cause despair or exaggerated cult of one’s own will, does 
not harm the freedom of human will (it has unique conceptions of free-
dom of choice, which are dynamic and free of determinisms!) – although it 
grants the central place to the God’s Will. Th us, it surrenders the personal 
life of individuals to the natural law and supernatural ethics32.
27  Ibidem, 48.
28  Ibidem, 49.
29  Ibidem, 51.
30  Ibidem.
31  Kowalski, Św. Tomasz, 37.
32  Ibidem, 39–40.
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– By combining the spirit and matter of human nature, Th omism presup-
poses that the spirit dominates the body (its domination is important in 
the educational processes). Th is principle is coupled with the supernatu-
ral purpose/destiny of man. Th is involves the principles of the perfect and 
good action (virtue). Th e study of virtues is the explanation of the balanced 
view on morality that is appropriate and recommended to man.
– Social life and society are considered to be the product of the natural pow-
ers and potency of man and the expression of God’s Will. Th ey are sub-
jected to the norm of morality whose ultimate principle (criterion and 
source) is neither man nor society, but the Creator’s Wisdom and Will. Al-
though man has connection with the society for the common good, it may 
not deprive him of his own purpose in any circumstance. In this regard, 
Th omism sits between individualism and anarchism on the one hand and 
collectivism and sociologism on the other33.
Th e above-mentioned assumptions are important due to the creator and the 
viewer and provide a point of departure for the discussion about their roles, 
rights, abilities, etc. On the other hand, in the highly ordered area of the entire 
Th omistic epistemology, noteworthy is the thesis that human cognition tran-
scends the sphere of sensuality and embraces the essence of things, as well34. It 
is worth noting that “man has no purely mental aesthetic intuition, i.e. no direct 
knowledge of non-material beauty”35.
Returning to the role of aesthetic impression, in the Neo-Th omistic theory 
of knowledge of beauty, one should point to the fact that it incorporates a har-
monious and balanced synthesis of both objectively transcendental and humanly 
psychological factors, which include: the intellectual element; emotional factors; 
the dexterity of the artist regarded as the direct cause of the work, the work it-
self – which is considered to be the purpose for the creative endeavour; and the 
idea – the pattern of the work in the artist’s mind36.
Th e above-mentioned elements of aesthetic cognition and education co-exist 
with its theoretical foundations, which imply that neither the artist nor the soci-
ety is recognised as the ultimate creator of the beauty or its criterion – these are 
present in God, so the immensity of beauty can be found in supernatural reality 
only37.
Another issue is the ability to judge the beauty and value of works of art 
(based on the principles of aesthetics and metaphysics of beauty). Such an ability 
33  Items, 34, 43.
34  Ibidem, 49.
35  Kowalski, Zagadnienie piękna, 49. Kowalski points out that this was proven by: O. Roland-
Gosselin OP, Peut-on parler d’intuition intellectuelle dans la philosophie thomiste? (Phil. perennis. 
Festig. Geyser II, p. 709–730). As cited in: ibidem.
36  Kowalski, Św. Tomasz…, 50.
37  Ibidem, 50–52.
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is commonly called an aesthetic taste38. Th e state of this ability falls within the 
scope of aesthetic education. In the end, aesthetic cognition includes emotional 
factors, “thanks to which art captivates the viewer so that he strives to contem-
plate the beautiful thing […]. Th is is the case due to «elements»”39 incorporated 
in the work by the creator and – as already mentioned – expressing his “personal-
ity” and also through the moral values contained in the work.
2. Art in the context of the knowledge of beauty
A work of art is considered to be “an original work produced by the artist in an 
orderly fashion in a certain matter which includes and emphasises the value, i.e. 
the content of being of a certain general substance”40. A work of art is considered 
to be “an objective support” for aesthetic impression. It is an object that was given 
brilliance and splendour by the artist. Th e act of art is not a slave copy of reality, 
but on the other hand, it is emphasised that “a work of art requires some funda-
mental consideration of existences of reality”41 while stressing that it should not 
be a slave copy of reality. Th e analysis of a work of art cannot give a suffi  cient an-
swer to the question: what is art. One must also take into account the artist who 
is the creator of the aesthetic object and thus a subject of art. Art is also defi ned as 
a “subjective state” in the mind of the creator42.
Th e Neo-Th omistic theory of beauty and art uses the term of “rectitude”. So as 
not to alienate a contemporary artist, it must be added that the main “element” of 
<rectitude> (rectitudo) is based on the purposefulness of the works of beauty as 
such (Neo-Th omists themselves used the term “rectitude” in quotation marks – 
JK)”43. Th e purpose of art – in the broadest sense – is “to emphasise the value of 
being of an idea”44. Among the above-mentioned “rectitudes”, which should not 
be understood as limitations of the artist, the tendency of the will for good and 
the speculative purpose (the beauty of form) is exposed. An actual inability of 
the artist to follow these “rectitudes” is justifi ed with the possible fact of their 
ineptitude in life. As part of the justifi cation, it is also stated that “[…] certain 
speculative superiority of aestheticians in the fi eld of thought and ideals oft en 
stems from the intellectual superiority of art over technique and prudence”45. By 
combining thinking about beauty with art, we can say that beauty is the correct 
pursuit of the creator’s will.
38  Kowalski, Zagadnienie piękna, 51.
39  Ibidem, 54.
40  Ibidem, 52.
41  Ibidem.
42  Ibidem, 54.
43  Ibidem.
44  Ibidem, 55.
45  Ibidem.
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Th e above-mentioned elements of beauty and its knowledge coexist with its 
theoretical foundations, which imply that neither the artist nor the society is rec-
ognised as the ultimate creator of the beauty or its testament – the immensity of 
beauty can be found in supernatural reality46.
Elements of aesthetic education
So far humanism has had a lot of <faces> and roads for its realisation, and the es-
sential reason for such state of things has been the anchoring of its creators and 
commentators in the realistic (including Neo-Th omist) or idealistic philosophy. 
Th e adherents of the latter – taking advantage of its rules (such as loyalty to ideas, 
their priority and the priority of thought) – use them to determine the devel-
opment of science, pushing it toward ideologies (e.g. racism). Following in the 
footsteps of the Cartesian tradition (“I think so I am” rejected my realism), they 
made – to summarise this Neo-Th omistic conjecture – numerous errors, situat-
ing many issues beyond the objective and intersubjectively verifi able discourse. 
Idealism continually “multiplies pseudo-problems and <isms> that sanction their 
solemnity […]; a priori visions of ideal civilisations and cultures; their implemen-
tation in politics results in social totalitarianism and cultural uniformity”47. The 
aesthetic  education incorporated in them can take on the traits  of 
the former or latter  tradit ion .
1. Neo-Th omistic theory of cognition in relation to elements of 
education – including aesthetic education
Within the area of the Neo-Th omistic theory of cognition, one must not – writes 
K. Kowalski – play with fi ctions or base one’s claims on the relative conclusions 
arising from a selected idea, from the disturbances of sensual or other powers. 
Th e Neo-Th omistic philosophy is a vital re-creation of the order of the universe 
in the human mind, the knowledge of what is or can be48. K. Kowalski undertakes 
the task of identifying the most important features of Neo-Th omism which, in 
his opinion, have the deepest impact in the fi eld of pedagogy. Th ese are: “abso-
lutism, intellectualism, spiritualism, objectivism and realism of Th omas Aquinas’ 
philosophy”49.
46  Kowalski, Św. Tomasz, 50–20.
47  Henryk Kiereś, „Idealizm”, in: Powszechna encyklopedia fi lozofi i, vol. 4 (Lublin: PTTA 
2003), 725.
48  Kowalski, „Pożyteczność zasadniczych cech fi lozofi i św. Tomasza dla wychowawców”, 
93–94.
49  Ibidem, 95.
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Absolutism, which means the objectivism and absoluteness of Th omism here, 
continues to have important relations with the qualitative characteristics of edu-
cation. A characteristic of the philosophy of St. Th omas is the principle that hu-
man reason cannot be satisfi ed with relative truths. Th e mere possibility of scep-
ticism – claims Kowalski – is a proof of the tendency of the reason for absolute 
statements. On this issue, St. Th omas “assimilates and deepens the position of St. 
Augustine on the knowledge of absolute truths […]. For the educator and educa-
tion, this principle is of fundamental importance. Th e value of absolute truths 
and rules gives the educational work a constant orientation, consistency and uni-
formity. It protects against overestimation of trivial experiences and generalisa-
tions of particular insights and serves as a protection against momentary moods, 
the illusionary power of momentary success or transient failures. For the student, 
on the other hand, the conviction of the value of absolute truths is the beginning 
of a solid, unifi ed and harmonious life orientation that opens the eyes to the value 
of long-term and consistent self-improvement50.
Th e absolute (objective) truth gives direction to the principal powers – reason 
and will; it does not destroy the dynamism of life, spiritual work, the freedom of 
discussion and examination. It is worth emphasising the fact that K. Kowalski ac-
knowledges the entire area of relative issues which cannot be objectively declared. 
Th is should not, however, be interpreted as a consent for cognitive or moral rela-
tivism. Furthermore, it is acknowledged that this is the result of the consistent 
application of the principle of objectivism – as it means that the problem itself or 
its solution may not be suffi  ciently (examined) known.
In the philosophy of St. Th omas, the characteristic of objectivism – in Kowal-
ski’s interpretation – is attributed to the statements of the mind which “reproduce 
the objective situation, self-included and independent of any conscious action of 
the powers of the cogniser. Th us, it is contrasted with […] any theories of sub-
jectivist sentimentality, intuitionism and voluntarism”51. Th is is opposed by the 
human thought which became – as Kowalski argues – the centre of “religious 
occupations” of Protestantism and which distanced itself from the objectivism, 
selecting the human self as the “centre of the universe, attributing creative cogni-
tion, independent will to it […]. Hence, many <modern> people – in theory at 
least – build their world and the view the world on the basis of purely subjective 
factors, which are not subject to any rules or norms […]. In fact, these people 
surrender to theoretical, unstructured infl uences of their will, feelings, fantasies 
and other lower powers in their lives”52. In this way they create an anarchy of in-
tellectual life, which – according to Kowalski – impacts their practical life and the 
entire reality.
50  Ibidem, 96.
51  Kowalski, „Pożyteczność zasadniczych cech…”, 106.
52  Ibidem.
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Such a state of thought in science translates into the practice of education and 
carries negative consequences therefor. Th e youth who absorb the atmosphere of 
the environment imbued with subjectivist attitudes approve of the ambiguity of 
scientifi c thought, excessive subjective ambitions, lack of obedience to the over-
riding laws. Th us, one can see the failure to recognise the virtues of others and 
respect objectively justifi ed opinions of other people on a daily basis in the be-
haviour of people who have allegedly received education53.
As a result of respecting objectivism in education in the processes of cognition 
and morality that occur there and in aesthetic (artistic) education, the participant 
(pupil/ student and teacher/lecturer):
– is not and does not feel as “the centre of the universe”; recognises that his 
reason is not God’s creative powers (although it can and should be creative 
in itself);
– is dependent on external objects in cognition – their reality is confronted 
with them and intentions related to them;
– their individual will is not supreme because it has to reconcile their deci-
sion with the moral norms (although it has the freedom to choose while 
taking this norm into account).
Only these elementary rectitudes – straight from the realistic order (and rea-
son), from the realistic (and also Th omistic) philosophy of cognition and educa-
tion – protect the school (also the higher school) against “going into service” of 
an idea, an overriding principle, a political project, an ideology – whatever it may 
be.
In the fi eld of education, this results in the acknowledgement of the author-
ity and obedience (understood as in F.W. Foerster cited below) as fundamen-
tal values. Th e objectivism of St. Th omas’ philosophy is considered one of the 
conditions of healthy educational theory and practice. Experts in St. Th omas’ 
philosophy fi nd two methods in moral education: deductive and architectural, 
which allows to apply general principles to specifi c cases – hence the individual 
element does not disappear either in moral or educational philosophy54. Neither 
does it disappear in the creative work of the artist, in the aesthetic experience and 
aesthetics.
(Neo)Th omism is an intellectualistic system – reason is the supreme power of 
human nature. Th e development of reason towards perfection is the most impor-
tant of man’s goals in the natural order. Kowalski derives the obligations related 
to the educator’s attitude from this very principle: he should be a loving person 
who cultivates the mind; he should be characterised by optimistic life intellectual-
ism in relation to himself and the work with the student55. K. Kowalski cites rele-
53  Ibidem, 107.
54  Kowalski, „Pożyteczność zasadniczych cech…”, 108–109.
55  Ibidem, 98.
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vant excerpts from Summa Th ., where St. Th omas recommends not surrendering 
to the authority of the teacher. What is more, he warns not to succumb to pas-
sions, fantasies, will and other circumstances in the knowledge of sympathy and 
antipathy. On the Neo-Th omistic ground, such an intellectual attitude harmon-
ises with loyalty and obedience56 to the educator. Improving the reason is justifi ed 
by its function that controls moral conduct, but it is not the human mind that is 
the ultimate instance here. It is the Reason and Will of God57. It is believed that 
acceptance of the truths of faith not only does not dishonour reason but elevates 
it and human dignity in the optics of God’s love (the super-nature does not de-
stroy nature). Th e rights of the will are confi rmed in the analysis of the act and 
in its primary role in the pursuit of the supernatural purpose. In the harmony of 
collaboration of reason and will, the purpose of reason is to know and indicate 
the order and the purpose of will it to make it happen and maintain it.58
From the spiritualism consisting in the superiority of the spirit over the mat-
ter, it follows that the body culture (physical education) recedes into the back-
ground in the fi eld of education and may not disrupt the “theoretical and practi-
cal primacy of the spirit in general and in particular the hegemony of education, 
development and refi nement of the spiritual powers”59. Sensory powers, however, 
should not be despised or destroyed but organised and subordinated to the rea-
son and will.
Realism. K. Kowalski writes about the St. Th omas’ philosophy that it is real-
istic and synthetic and based on the assertion that human reason recognises real 
objects; he teaches that human reason can reach knowledge of “absolute certain-
ty” and not just knowledge of representation and abstraction.
Knowing and utilising “the power of three degrees of Aristotelian abstraction, 
the critical-realistic philosophy of St. Th omas leaves Kant’s critique, Bergson’s in-
tuitionism, Scheller’s phenomenological and intuitive philosophy of religion, psy-
chologism, positivism, pragmatism, sociologism, historicism and scientism far 
behind”60. Th e breadth of views and optimism about the issue of cognition pro-
vide important pedagogical support in the pedagogical process. “Critical but fair 
appreciation of the power of human reason, the realisation that the will – togeth-
er with the human soul – is not distorted and corrupted at its bottom, will allow 
56  Obedience is not to be understood as mindless submission, but rather as acceptance of be-
ing, a spiritual need, loyalty to ideals and values (see: Janina Kostkiewicz, Wychowanie do wolności 
wyboru. Ponadczasowy wymiar pedagogiki Fryderyka Wilhelma Foerstera (Kraków: Ofi cyna Wy-
dawnicza „Impuls” 2008), 197–212.
57  Kowalski, „Pożyteczność zasadniczych cech…”, 99.
58  Ibidem, 100–102.
59  Ibidem, 103. K. Kowalski writes that sports records should be placed lower than math-
ematical ones in the hierarchy of pedagogical values. Th is principle of domination of the spirit over 
the matter is the basis for e.g. the ethics in sexual education and ethics of sexual life (ibidem, 104).
60  Ibidem, 109.
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it to avoid the errors which were introduced by the unbalanced and pessimistic 
theories of pseudo-reformers, Hobbes and others, in the context of realism”61.
What does this type of realism bring to education? Th e fruit of the deep and 
moderate optimism of St. Th omas is the principle of trust and absolute sin-
cerity. Th e principle of sincerity is derived by Kowalski from the inalienable 
fact of Th omistic theology that man “is created by God in his essence and his 
existence”62. As a fi nite being (existing for a moment in history in the natural 
world) that is dependent on God, the only true way to relate to Him that man has 
is the way of sincerity.
Sincerity, trust, simplicity and obedience are qualities that, in Kowalski’s inter-
pretation, stem from the philosophy of St. Th omas for the entire sphere of educa-
tional activities. Th e original sin (the crack on good human nature) and the prin-
ciple of loving one’s neighbour results in a positive, optimistic, friendly pedagogy 
(which results from the pursuit of good) that protects the dignity of the student 
and the educator63.
Being under the infl uence of St. Augustine, Th omas Aquinas accepts that 
learning and gaining knowledge is “leading the mind out of the potency of cog-
nition into the act of cognition”64. K. Kowalski points out that the acquisition of 
knowledge can take place either through one’s reason (inventio) or using external 
help (disciplina). It is worth emphasising that “discipline” did not mean “rigour 
and oppression” in its original meaning in school language. A result of the work 
of St. Augustine and the “imposed” continuation by St. Th omas is the comparison 
that the work of the teacher is like the work of the doctor whose medicine is used 
by nature for recovery. From both of them comes the knowledge that the student 
is active in the process of acquiring knowledge (he is not a container to be fi lled 
with messages by the teacher) and reacts to the shared knowledge and uses it 
to acquire more knowledge65.
Following K. Kowalski’s analyses, it is possible to derive not only elements 
of pedeutology and general methodology of education (general didactics) from 
the philosophy of St. Th omas. Here are the foundations of the organisation of 
the teaching-learning process, later found in the works of 19th-century didacti-
cians in a developed or changed form. Th ese elements of didactics are noticed 
61  Ibidem, 110.
62  Ibidem, 111.
63  Kowalski reaches for specifi c issues of St. Th omas’ philosophy and brings closer the most 
important – in his opinion – issue of “the judgements of neighbours” (ibidem).
64  K. Kowalski, Nauczanie i nauczyciel podług św. Augustyna i św. Tomasza z Akwinu, w: tenże, 
„Św. Tomasz z Akwinu a czasy obecne”, dz. cyt., 166. 
65  Ibidem, 167.
107
and developed in the next text66 not only by K. Kowalski but others67, as well. 
According to Kowalski, “communication of knowledge” (K. Kowalski’s formula-
tion) consists of three stages: fi rst, “the conception in the mind of the content 
of what is to be communicated, secondly verbal expression through which that 
which is conceived by the mind presents itself and penetrates into the mind of 
the student, and fi nally the explanation of the thing expressed, through which it 
becomes clear”68. Th e teacher’s thinking process demonstrated in the above steps 
and presented to the student becomes a tool in the mind of the student so that 
the student can acquire new knowledge. In this way, the teacher conducts this 
transfer of student’s knowledge from potency to act, becoming the perpetrator of 
his perfection. Kowalski refers here not only to relevant excerpts of the Summa 
Th eologica but also to many of its interpreters69.
Th e above-mentioned state of aff airs needs to be complemented with the as-
sumption adopted previously by St. Th omas that in the human mind there ex-
ist the so-called fi rst principles that cannot be “poured in” by the teacher and 
which are due to “divine causality”, but the student’s mind can be reinforced by 
the teacher. Omitting the complexity of the explanations of the entire problem, 
it is worth emphasising that “the teacher’s words play the same role in the learn-
er’s cognitive process as real objects. However, they are more prone to evoking 
knowledge than sensory things because they provide a better expression of the 
truths that the teacher already has in his mind”70. In the problem of the meth-
odology of education, specifi c indications are provided in St. Th omas writings: 
e.g. a good teacher stoops to the level of the student, which results in him divid-
ing the content of the subject into parts that do not outweigh the learner’s ability 
to comprehend.
Kazimierz Kowalski claims that St. Th omas applied these recommendations 
masterfully in his Summa, attributing a high rank to the teaching profession, 
which entailed such a rank for a school as a social institution too. In the opinion 
of K. Kowalski, St. Th omas did not make the mistake of the anthropocentrism 
typical of ancient and many medieval thinkers. While emphasising the value and 
meaning of the “fi nite being”, i.e. the teacher-man, he saw that it was in his ability 
66  Kazimierz Kowalski, „Filozofi czne podstawy dydaktyki katolickiej”, Miesięcznik Kateche-
tyczny i Wychowawczy 8(1937): 136–149.
67  Cf. e.g. Wincenty Granat, „Podstawy niekatolickiej i katolickiej dydaktyki”, Ateneum Ka-
płańskie 35(1935): 455–473; 36(1935): 136–149; Antoni Jankowski, „Wychowanie i nauczanie”, Ate-
neum Kapłańskie 32(1933): 245–260; Witold Rubczyński, „Praca nad umysłowością, wolą i charak-
terem”, Kwartalnik Pedagogiczny 1(1931): 3–36.
68  Kowalski, Nauczanie i nauczyciel, 168.
69  E.g. for: Martin Grabmann, “Die Psychologie des Lehrens und des Lernens nach dem hl. 
Th omas von Aquin”, Die christliche Schule 1(1910): 145–151.
70  Kowalski, Nauczanie i nauczyciel…, 170–171.
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to really support the student in cognition. He interpreted this fact simultaneously 
as a proof of the goodness and perfection of God71. 
Beauty, art and its educational tasks and postulates of Neo-Th omists created 
a methodology of aesthetic education that takes into account the psychology of 
aesthetic experience. It was applied in the pedagogical practice of B. Żulińska. In 
her theoretical views on these issues, we fi nd numerous references to the most 
eminent psychologists: J. Sully, W. Zienkowski and S. Szuman. Żulińska’s contri-
bution consists in addressing the role of beauty in the child’s life. Its world of art, 
B. Żulińska claims, already exists in play. For children, there are no fi elds of art – 
text, rhythm, melody, body movement are all one; drawings and cut-outs are an 
expression of the aesthetic life. One must not discourage from even the most 
spontaneous artistry with one’s criticism or irony. It is not enough to allow the 
child to let its imagination run wild – this imagination must be educated. Here, 
beauty itself is an educator and the role of the educator is to be just an intermedi-
ary. Beauty should permeate all education72.
Comparing the above to the realities of the 20th century interwar period, 
K. Kowalski writes that so many of the so-called modern people build their own 
philosophies of life solely by taking into account “purely subjective factors, which 
are not subject to any objective rules or principles […] In fact, these people sur-
render to theoretical, unstructured infl uences of their will, feelings, fantasies and 
other lower powers in their lives”73.
2. Art in personality development
Neo-Th omists agree that broadly understood education must not be limited 
to the upbringing of the intellect. Recognising the truth and beauty as the at-
tributes of being as such, Karol Górski argued that it is possible to speak of the 
truth or beauty depending on the way of cognition and the point of view. Th is 
important insight is reinforced by the fact that he views the use of beauty and the 
pleasure that fl ows from it as a part of the order of the intellect74. In his view, in 
higher education particularly important is the awareness of the academic teacher 
that cognition of being occurs in two ways – through slow and mundane learning 
based on dispute and reasoning and through sudden revelation in contempla-
tion. Th e latter, in particular, applies to beauty75. However, the educationalist is 
71  Ibidem, p. 175. St. Th omas’ view on the role of the teacher and the process of cognition 
(teaching-learning) is complemented by his refl ections on the gift  of reason, which Kowalski rec-
ommends as particularly useful for the teacher [ibidem: K. Kowalski refers to: M. Meschler, Die 
Gabe des heiligen Pfi ngstfestes (Freiburg 1922), 242].
72  Żulińska, Ku zmartwychwstaniu, 603–620; Also, „Więcej twórczości”. Miesięcznik Kateche-
tyczny i Wychowawczy 10(1930): 465–470. See also: Kostkiewicz, Kierunki, 293–294.
73  Kowalski, Pożyteczność zasadniczych, 106.
74  Karol Górski, Wychowanie personalistyczne (Poznań: NIAK 1936), 56.
75  Ibidem, 55.
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interested in the question of what is educational – i.e. personality-creative and 
developmental – meaning of beauty?
Th e answer, in my opinion, can be found in the kind and the result of cogni-
tion: “the excess of joy, which is the essence of the pleasure of beauty, fl ows” from 
the knowledge of beauty (through contemplation and revelation)76. Th is thesis is 
developed by K. Górski, taking into consideration the educational point of view. 
In the love of beauty, Górski sees the rest and respite necessary for development. 
Th is pleasure of beauty is not entertainment – it is the rest and respite coming 
from another kind of cognition. Respite is conducive to bringing order in rela-
tions with the world, proper evaluation of the cognised being and interpersonal 
relations.
All this seems to have the greater educational signifi cance, the more mature 
(in psychic volitional terms) the person we are dealing with is. Th e more exposed 
to chaos (disorderly excess of stimuli, information and experiences) our student 
is (this kind of student is primarily a high-school or university student), the more 
important eff ects of knowledge of beauty (joyful respite) will be. Th is demon-
strates the necessity of providing opportunities for contemplation of beauty in 
the process of the organisation of study. 
Th e educational and developmental eff ects are achieved through the knowl-
edge of beauty, because the student – as a subject of aesthetic impressions – en-
gages not only his senses in the knowledge of beauty but also his constructive 
imagination (fantasy), mental factors (his mind and will), i.e. all of his mind, not 
to mention the lower desire powers. A Neo-Th omist, however, will not agree with 
the view that man experiences the unity and depth of his soul through aesthetic 
intuition77.
In aesthetic education, the sincerity of art is important at every level of educa-
tion. Th e proper attitude towards art is an important factor in the development of 
personality: art raises and ennobles only if it is sincere; if it delights, then it brings 
pleasure. Th e sincerity of art in its personality-creative mission does not equate 
with the truth. From the viewpoint of its educational role, it is the artist’s sincerity 
that is the most important in the work – claims K. Górski – and the artist’s insin-
cerity gives birth to an insincere work. Being recognisable by the audience, this 
insincerity becomes dangerous if the artist – seeking admiration for the work – 
deliberately appeals to the audience’s lower instincts or if he himself has not been 
able to liberate himself from them during the creative process. 
Insincere art inhibits the development of personality – says K. Górski – and 
pleases those who do not have the inner simplicity that is typical of developed 
personalities. Th e evil of this insincerity lies in the fact that it evokes in the viewer 
the same feelings that gave birth to the insincerity in the heart of the artist in the 
76  Ibidem, 56. See also: Kostkiewicz, Kierunki i koncepcje, 386–388.
77  Kowalski, Zagadnienie piękna, 50.
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fi rst place. Th us e.g. through its sincerity or insincerity, art becomes the master of 
the creation of man’s (pupil’s, student’s or adult’s) personality. In these facts, art 
comes close to ethics. Th eirs is an important relationship. Neo-Th omists argue 
that art itself is not subject to the virtue of prudence and does not seek to make 
man better; it is about the work of art. In fact, Górski sees a confl ict between 
ethics and art there. It is illuminated by the principle that the artist possessing 
ethics “as his own” unknowingly created works of ethics. However, if the artist 
were to impose ethics on himself (without internal consent), he would become 
a slave to his art. On this issue, K. Górski identifi es with the views of J. Maritain 
expressed in Art et scholastique78.
Ending 
Beauty, considered to be a property of being in the Neo-Th omistic views, allows 
one to see it as a property of reality and of human artefacts, including art. Its con-
ception allows it to be found in human behaviours and in the tradition of culture 
in the form of harmony, perfection and brilliance.
Th e love of beauty incorporates the rest and respite necessary for human de-
velopment. Not being subject to the virtue of prudence, art itself does not seek 
to make man better – because it is all about the work of art. Neo-Th omists see 
a confl ict between ethics and art in this fact. However, the danger does not occur 
when the artist takes ethics “as his own” – in such a case, he unknowingly creates 
ethical works. Man should not “worship” art as it does not bring him or art itself 
any good results. Th e proper attitude towards art is an important factor in the de-
velopment of personality: art raises and ennobles if it is sincere; if it delights, then 
it brings pleasure. Th e sincerity of art seems to be an issue of special importance 
to Górski – he does not equate the sincerity of art with the truth in the personal-
ity-creative mission that art pursues. Th e recognition of beauty as a property of 
being translates into the rules of aesthetic cognition. Th e high rank of aesthetics 
in Neo-Th omism makes aesthetic education very important, as well. 
Seeking manifestations of the insincerity of art, Neo-Th omists come to the 
following conclusions: “Humanistic hedonism created the lie of the Renaissance, 
which survived for several centuries – the lie so oft en seen in the falseness of co-
lours, lights, […]. In the worship of beauty, humanism exaggerated to the degree 
of being insincere. Naturalism introduces the cult of ugliness and disharmony so 
clearly visible in certain modern musical directions based on disharmony and 
78  Karol Górski, „Szczerość w sztukach pięknych a światopogląd katolicki”, Prąd 1(1936): 
1–16.
cult of dissonance”79. Will this message give a chance to Neo-Th omistic concepts 
of beauty, art and aesthetic education in the modern world?
Piękno, sztuka i elementy edukacji estetycznej w pismach polskich 
neotomistów dwudziestolecia międzywojennego
Streszczenie:  W poglądach neotomistów piękno uznawane jest za własność bytu, postrze-
gane jest jako właściwość rzeczywistości i ludzkich wytworów, w tym sztuki. Można je 
odnajdywać w sposobach ludzkiego postępowania, w tradycji kultury pod postacią harmo-
nii, doskonałości lub blasku. Badanie piękna podlega naczelnym regułom badań w metafi zyce. 
Piękno jest istotnym czynnikiem rozwoju osobowości: podnosi i uszlachetnia. W umiłowanie 
piękna wpisany jest wypoczynek, wytchnienie niezbędne dla rozwoju człowieka. Sztuka 
sama w sobie nie podlega cnocie roztropności, nie dąży, by człowieka czynić lepszym, jej 
chodzi o dzieło. W fakcie tym neotomiści dostrzegają konfl ikt między moralnością a sztuką; 
niebezpieczeństwo nie zachodzi jednak, gdy artysta posiada etykę „na własność”, wówczas 
bezwiednie tworzy dzieła etyczne. Sztuka posiada bez wątpienia wielkie znaczenie społeczne 
i powinna spełniać doniosłą misję społeczną przez edukację estetyczną, poprzez udostępnienie 
jak najszerszym warstwom ludzkości piękna, prawdy i dobra.
Słowa kluczowe: neotomizm, piękno, sztuka, edukacja estetyczna, edukacja artystyczna, 
humanizm, harmonia, obiektywizm, Kazimierz Kowalski, Karol Górski, Barbara Żulińska.
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